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 Online Dispute Resolution for Smart 
Contracts 
By Amy J. Schmitz* and Colin Rule* 
Smart contracts built in the blockchain are quietly revolutionizing tradi-
tional transactions despite their questionable status under current law.  At 
the same time, disputes regarding smart contracts are inevitable, and par-
ties will need means for dealing with smart contract issues.  This Article 
tackles this challenge, and proposes that parties turn to online dispute res-
olution (“ODR”) to efficiently and fairly resolve smart contract disputes. 
Furthermore, the Article acknowledges the benefits and challenges of cur-
rent blockchain ODR start-ups, and proposes specific ideas for how de-
signers could address those challenges and incorporate ODR to provide 
just resolutions that will not stymie efficiencies of smart contracts.  None-
theless, the Article also raises pivotal cautions and questions for ensuring 
the fairness and transparency of these solutions over the longer term. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
It is no secret that technology is disrupting many industries, including law.1  In 
fact, technology is revolutionizing the art of deal-making by leaps and bounds.  
Gone are the days when most deals were negotiated in person and sealed with a 
handshake.2  Instead, we now expect to make most purchases online through e-
contracts, sealed with a click on the “accept” button.3  Even corporate leaders now 
use e-mails and texts to negotiate deals, which they eventually “sign” online through 
services like Docusign.4 
Despite our current comfort with these new types of online contracts, “smart 
contracts” on the blockchain push the envelope even further into the digital age.  
Smart contracts are different from traditional or common e-contracts in that they 
are essentially computer code.5  Those with no coding background cannot easily 
interpret a smart contract in its rawest form.  Instead, these contracts are spread 
across blockchain nodes distributed throughout the world.6  In other words, they are 
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made up of “nodes” which consist of computer coded algorithms that live in a de-
centralized ledger (blockchain).7  Indeed, even attempting to summarize an expla-
nation of smart contracts in an article Introduction seems foolish, and thus greater 
explanation is provided in Part II of this article. 
Although most do not fully understand smart contracts, hype about their use is 
building.  Futurists predict that smart contracts will create efficiencies and resolve 
transactional trust issues.8  Smart contracts may largely eliminate the need for com-
plicated and costly letters of credit, bonds, and security agreements by digitizing 
automatic enforcement, or payment.9  For example, the Consensus 2018 conference 
brought together thousands of industry leaders interested in blockchain, including 
companies like FedEx, which are exploring blockchain as a logistics utility.10  Fur-
thermore, at the conference Microsoft announced the Azure Cloud Blockchain 
Workbench, and automobile manufacturer Renault unveiled its plan to use block-
chain for supply chain management.  At the same time, Ripple announced the ex-
pansion of the XRP cryptocurrency via its new initiative X-Spring, and made a 
splash with Snoop Dog performing at the XRP Community Night after party.11 
Despite this kind of hype around blockchain, however, these new approaches 
raise new dilemmas.  As Ethan Katsh, the Father of Online Dispute Resolution, has 
put it: the power of technology to resolve disputes is exceeded by the power of 
technology to generate disputes.12  Inevitably, disagreements will arise regarding 
the coding and content of smart contracts.13  Trade disputes may arise within infor-
mation placed in the blockchain, or smart contracts may be manipulated by fake 
data, which will require quick and effective resolution to prevent major financial 
loss.14  For example, a 2016 study revealed that there are 100 errors per 1,000 lines 
of coding. 15  Extrapolated to smart contracts, this means that many smart contracts 
may not be accurately coded to encompass the parties’ original intentions.16 Indeed, 
coders may be sued for liability as a result of inaccurate smart contracts, or hackers 
prosecuted for interfering with or manipulating smart contracts.17 
At the same time, there is no articulated and clear system of rules that apply to 
smart contracts.18  Civil law only recognizes contracts that are in written or docu-
mentary form, and common law contract rules dependent on choice of law do not 
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fit the decentralized blockchain model.19  It also may be difficult to fit square con-
cepts of offer, acceptance and consideration into the round hole of smart contracts. 
Additionally, if a matter falls under the statute of frauds, it is unclear whether a 
coded transaction will constitute a “writing” and whether the keys to encrypt the 
smart contracts will constitute signatures of the parties.20 
Nonetheless, even if one could get past civil and contract law principles in es-
tablishing agreement underlying smart contracts, that does not mean that classical 
rules will provide remedies if problems develop.21  What remedies exist for the 
smart contract party who wants to prevent or reverse enforcement? If this were a 
traditional contract, a party could rescind it in court, but smart contracts on the 
blockchain present a different set of challenges. Enforcement is automatic, and the 
code is immutable.  Again, these are not really “contracts” in the true sense of the 
word, understood by most as negotiated terms in an arms-length transaction (or 
“meeting of the minds”).  Thus, users may have different expectations, which means 
disputes will be inevitable. 
That again raises the question: Where will parties turn to resolve their smart 
contract disputes?  Litigation seems nonsensical since it is unclear whether or how 
contract law should apply, what laws govern the transaction, and what evidence 
could be collected to adjudicate the matter.  Plus, offline litigation undermines the 
efficiency and scalability of smart contracts.  Furthermore, the anonymous nature 
of smart contracts and the fluidity of online identities make it difficult to determine 
who the parties actually are.  Meanwhile, the decentralized nature of smart contracts 
prevents courts from exercising jurisdiction or determining choice of law.22  At the 
same time, it is difficult to conceptualize how judges could fashion remedies that 
consist of developing new code to update a smart contract deployed on a block-
chain.23 
The dilemma of dealing with smart contract disputes therefore remains.  Courts 
and traditional processes simply do not work for resolving smart contract disputes, 
making it imperative to invent the future.  Bill Gates famously said, “Let’s go invent 
tomorrow instead of worrying about what happened yesterday.”24  This Article 
therefore envisions a solution for smart contract dispute resolution, and proposes 
online dispute resolution (“ODR”) built into smart contracts to efficiently and fairly 
resolve disputes that arise along the way.  The Article also raises cautions that de-
velopers and policymakers must consider as they build these ODR solutions. 
This Article proceeds from description to prescription in light of the confusion 
surrounding smart contracts.  Accordingly, Part II of the Article will take a step 
back and provide greater explanation and background on the evolution of smart 
contracts, and their rise amidst the growth of cryptocurrencies.  Part III further tack-
les questions regarding the complexities of smart contracts and their status under 
current law.  Part IV then expands the conversation to consider new means for deal-
ing with smart contract issues.  This will include discussion of current innovations, 
as well as new prescriptions for incorporating ODR in the blockchain to provide 
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fast and fair resolution.  Part V will add cautions for policymakers and businesses 
to consider as they build these ODR solutions, and will envision next steps for ro-
bust smart contract solutions.  Part VI will summarize conclusions. 
II. THE RISE OF SMART CONTRACTS 
A.  Contracts vs. Smart Contracts 
Smart contracts are confusing.  Many, if not most, people have heard the term, 
but are unclear what it means or why smart contracts are revolutionary.  Accord-
ingly, the first challenge is to explain how smart contracts work, what benefits they 
provide, and why they may offer a better option for efficient and secure transactions 
in particular contexts. 
Nearly everyone knows what a traditional legal contract entails.  Whether we 
buy “101 Business Contracts” off the shelf at Office Depot or pay a white-shoe law 
firm thousands of dollars to negotiate a contract, we generally understand “deals,” 
aka contracts.  Most see a contract as a document that details an agreement that 
parties execute with the expectation that it is legally binding.  Whether it is an agree-
ment to open a bank account, buy stock, or work at a restaurant, most view the 
structure and cadence of contracts to include offer, acceptance, and consideration, 
with signature and date at the bottom. 
This model of making and enforcing agreements is closely tied to the judicial 
system.  Judicial enforcement is the endgame.  Accordingly, if a party violates the 
terms, she can go to court and insist that the other party perform or pay damages for 
breach.  Furthermore, if parties disagree about the interpretation of the contract 
terms, the court has power to decipher the parties’ arguments and make final deter-
minations regarding the parties’ obligations.  It is a highly manual process, often 
involving expensive lawyers and slow-moving courts. 
The traditional contract model is nonetheless changing in the digital age.  As 
noted above, many consumers agree to contracts each day by clicking a button and 
“accepting” terms they never read, while purchasing goods and services on the in-
ternet.25  As one study of end user license agreements from 2003–2010 showed, 
online contracts have become an accepted norm.  Furthermore, they have become 
longer and increasingly less favorable to consumers.26  Nonetheless, courts have 
generally enforced these “clickwrap” and “browsewrap” contracts in the name of 
efficiency.27  In a sense, it is considered consumers’ own fault if they end up bound 
to unfavorable contracts they failed to read. 
In contrast to traditional paper and e-contracts, smart contracts bypass and ig-
nore the legal model.  Judicial enforcement is not their endgame.  Instead of paying 
lawyers to write paper documents filled with complex legalese, parties use technol-
ogy to draft agreements in code so that there is no ambiguity around the parties’ 
obligations.  These agreements involve no paper-shuffling or ink signatures at the 
bottom.  Instead, smart contracts are computer programs filled with “if/then” 
clauses laying out each obligation and eventuality.  These computer programs, once 
created and formally accepted by both parties, can be self-enforcing, running in the 
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cloud.  Continuous monitoring of key performance metrics determines when one of 
the “if/then” clauses suddenly switches from false to true, triggering automatic en-
forcement. 
Through auto-enforcement, smart contracts can add efficiencies for many kinds 
of agreements.  This includes rental, intellectual property, financing, shipping, and 
manufacturing contracts.  Parties need not worry about facing the inefficiencies of 
litigation or fighting for payment when the terms and enforcement are already pre-
determined and established in the computer coding per “if/then” rules.  If event “x” 
happens (e.g. a website is launched), then “y” occurs (e.g. payment is made).  Hav-
ing this built into unchangeable computer code, with assured payment upon perfor-
mance, addresses trust issues that often stymie traditional deals based on a hand-
shake.28   Again, this means that smart contracts largely eliminate the need for the 
complicated and costly means for securing payment such as letters of credit, bonds, 
and security agreements. 
B. The Role of the Blockchain in Smart Contracts 
One of the key technologies behind smart contracts is the blockchain.  A block-
chain is a distributed ledger (like a distributed database) spread across the internet.  
It allows for information to be entered into the system and stored in different, re-
dundant locations located throughout the world.  When a document is put into the 
blockchain, it is replicated across every archival node, so even if half of the nodes 
go down for some reason, the data is still available.  Imagine if you had a notepad 
where everything you wrote in the notepad would be duplicated exactly in other 
notepads around the world (and everything written in those notepads would appear 
in your notepad as well).  Even if your notepad was destroyed, the other notepads 
around the world would have everything you wrote in it, so the contents would 
never be lost. 
Also, imagine if there were global rules that governed what could be written in 
the notepads.  If someone tried to write something in a notepad that didn’t follow 
the rules, then all the other notepads would reject it.  This is another feature of the 
blockchain: if someone provides an update that doesn’t follow the network rules, 
then the other nodes will evaluate the contribution and determine the update doesn’t 
comply, so they will not add it to the definitive ledger.  That makes spoofing or 
editing information previously submitted into the blockchain extremely difficult, if 
not impossible.  Moreover, the complexity of coordinating changes across all nodes 
in the blockchain is so significant that any would-be hackers would have an almost 
insurmountable challenge in front of them. 
This makes smart contracts built into the blockchain incredibly powerful.  As 
noted above, smart contracts are already self-enforcing computer programs, but 
they become more secure when programmers drop them into the blockchain.  Smart 
contracts eliminate the need for paper documents, wet ink signatures, and for the 
most part—courts.  This new system, built on smart contracts and blockchain, en-
forces agreements through code instead of judges and jails.  Jurisdiction and legal 
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rules become largely irrelevant because the system itself establishes the basis for 
enforcement.29 
In this new structure, a computer network manages all contracts across juris-
dictions.  That means that contract information is not housed in one central location, 
vulnerable to outages and hackers.  This can enhance trust and enforceability, while 
reinforcing privacy and security.  The blockchain provides encryption with public 
and private keys, which are blockchain–based identification numbers provided by 
the network.30 
That said, it is important to note that blockchain is not impenetrable.  It is more 
secure than general cloud-based systems, but it can be “hacked” and has its own 
risks.31  Proponents of the blockchain claim that the distributed ledger is “immuta-
ble,” “secure,” and “trustless.”32  However, hackers could manipulate the technol-
ogy by, for example, using a “hard fork” to essentially create a copy of the block-
chain which might allow unscrupulous parties to manipulate the data and essentially 
“steal” information.  Indeed, a well-executed “hard fork” could even make a block-
chain vulnerable to corruption and collapse.33 
At the same time, blockchain is evolving in ways that make it less susceptible 
to attacks, and thus more reliable and trustworthy.  It is moving far beyond its ori-
gins in cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin.  The central objective of the blockchain was 
to create a self-regulating network that would enable the transfer of property be-
tween peers without the oversight of a third party, namely the courts and regula-
tors.34  However, the original Bitcoin system has been improved in newer platforms 
like Ethereum, which built on the initial Bitcoin architecture to allow for faster ex-
ecution and more flexible integration.  This moved the ball forward, but opening 
the door wider also enabled less experienced coders to leverage tools to design their 
own smart contracts, perhaps raising the risk of programming bugs and coding er-
rors.35 
These risks have not slowed the blockchain boom.36  In 2017, venture capital-
ists invested $1 billion in start-up blockchain companies.37  At the same time, block-
chain companies offered $5 billion in initial coin offerings (“ICOs”), which are now 
recognized by the Securities and Exchange Commission and regulated as securi-
ties.38  Other noteworthy initiatives include the “Dubai Blockchain Strategy,” which 
is a multi-pronged initiative by the Dubai Future Foundation and the Smart Dubai 
Office, to make Dubai the first city run essentially on the blockchain by the year 
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2020.39  Dubai therefore plans to move all essential records to the blockchain, in-
cluding health records, title transfers, identification verification data, wills, and data 
related to financing and exchanging goods.40 
Dubai is not alone in exploring blockchain to increase operational efficiency 
and reduce costs by eliminating intermediaries.41  For example, law firms are build-
ing blockchain departments.42  Their business clients have been experimenting with 
blockchain through venues like the Accord Project consortium. 43  Meanwhile, ma-
jor tech companies like IBM and standard setting groups like the IEEE have been 
working to set common data and performance standards for smart contracts, which 
are crucial for wide acceptance.44  In fact, ninety percent of Australian, European 
and North American banks are “experimenting” with using blockchain to verify and 
transfer financial “information and assets.”45  Additionally, twenty-five govern-
ments are piloting blockchain platforms.46 
Nonetheless, blockchain is still in its infancy, and will need to gain credibility 
and acceptance before it will truly scale.47  It will take some time for competitors to 
cooperate on issues regarding the system, the data, and the investments necessary 
to ensure system operation.48  However, blockchain technologies are becoming 
more robust and accessible, which is part of what is pushing smart contracts into 
wider use. 
C.  The Emerging New Normal 
Over the past year, smart contracts have leaped into the mainstream.  Rock-
etLawyer announced a partnership with smart contract pioneer OpenLaw and block-
chain developer ConsenSys to bring blockchain-based products to the online con-
sumer space.  This includes a “Rocket Wallet” that links RocketLawyer contracts 
to the Ethereum blockchain.49  Soon after, RocketLawyer’s main competitor, Le-
galZoom, announced a partnership with the company Clause to provide blockchain-
based smart contracts to their customers as well.50  The move toward smart contracts 
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is significant when the two largest online legal services companies in the United 
States take such steps forward in the mainstreaming of blockchain and smart con-
tracts in everyday legal services. 
These recent moves are also important in that they indicate how smart contracts 
integrate with standard currencies.  In other words, these moves open doors to smart 
contracts for those who have not embraced cryptocurrencies.51  As noted above, 
blockchain-based smart contracts initially evolved out of virtual currencies like 
Bitcoin and Ethereum.  Accordingly, one had to own these cryptocurrencies in order 
to participate in smart contracts.  However, ventures like OpenLaw, noted above, 
allow individuals and small businesses to make use of blockchain-based smart con-
tracts without the use of any cryptocurrency.  They are free to use United States 
dollars or British pounds (referred to as “fiat currencies” in the blockchain world).  
These tools therefore allow almost anyone to use a smart contract, even if they know 
nothing about blockchain and hold no cryptocurrency.52  
In sum, big and small businesses alike are trying to make smart contracts the 
new normal.  Integrating blockchain-based agreements into everyday legal tasks is 
a big step in that direction.  Individuals can leverage these technologies to establish 
trusted payments without need for traditional secured transactions.  Individuals may 
use smart contracts for day to day legal issues like employment contracts, rental 
agreements, and wills.  Once these approaches cross the tipping point, they will 
become commonplace in every sector of the economy. 
III. COMPLEXITIES AND CONFLICTS AROUND SMART CONTRACTS 
A. Unclear Legal Status 
Despite the hype around blockchain’s potential, smart contracts raise many un-
answered questions. Unforeseen disputes will almost certainly arise regarding con-
tract coding and execution. As noted above, there is even a risk that fake data will 
improperly trigger, or fail to trigger, smart contract clauses.  This may result in 
major financial losses.53  Computer programmers, or coders, also may face liability 
for erroneous coding.54  Coders working in concert with smart contract drafters 
could face damages for creating improperly structured contracts, while hackers may 
attempt to manipulate data to the advantage of one or the other party.55 
At the same time, there is no articulated and clear system of rules that apply to 
smart contracts.56  At the core of “contract law” is the concept of consent.  This idea 
of consent requires some effective communication of an intentional transfer of 
rights and obligations between parties.57  Presumably the parties to a smart contract, 
like any contract, will have consented to the terms underlying the code.58   However, 
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as noted earlier, smart contracts are translated into code without the same pageantry 
of traditional contracts.59  This means that it may be difficult for the parties to un-
derstand whether the code accurately memorializes their agreement.  In this way, 
smart contracts lack the usual cautionary, evidentiary, and channeling functions of 
written contracts in the traditional system.60  
By their nature, smart contracts codify agreement outside of the legal system.61 
Smart contracts may therefore allow parties to circumvent legal rules.62  This is why 
lawyers debate whether smart contracts are “contracts” in the legal sense.63  In com-
mon law, it is unclear that code constitutes true offer, acceptance and consideration. 
Civil lawyers then argue whether there is sufficient documentary evidence to sup-
port legal enforcement.64  Moreover, as of the time of the Article, no United States 
court has reviewed blockchain or smart contracts.65  No precedent has been set. 
Additionally, as noted above, even if one gets past contract formation questions 
by looking back to the originating documents, jurisdiction and other legal questions 
create hurdles for litigating smart contracts.66  Smart contracts on a blockchain are 
generally anonymous, and become even more anonymous when they use crypto-
currencies that make it nearly impossible to discover identities of the parties or their 
computers.67  Without knowing the identity and domicile of the parties, courts are 
unable to establish jurisdiction using traditional rules based on minimum contacts 
or physical presence.68 
Furthermore, even if a court could determine jurisdiction of the parties, it would 
be difficult for a court to interpret a smart contract, because the code is written to 
be understood by programmers, not lawyers and judges.69  At the same time, it 
would be difficult for a court to intervene to prevent or reverse automatic contract 
executions.70  Furthermore, it is difficult to see how courts will be able to fill gaps 
in smart contracts, especially given that blockchain does not generally allow for 
modifications.71  
That said, some argue that governance standards around the blockchain will 
emerge to promote “confidence in the technology and the legal and regulatory en-
vironment.”72  They see government or other standards groups dictating rules that 
will govern smart contracts.  In the United States, states are beginning to introduce 
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and pass legislation regarding enforcement of smart contracts.73  Some commenta-
tors also have proposed that legal rules could be coded into the blockchain contracts 
themselves.74  
The problem with these ideas for governmental regulation, however, is that 
blockchain technology is advancing at breakneck speed.  Meanwhile, traditional 
legal systems are notoriously reactive and slow to act.75  Furthermore, regulations 
would have to be international and widely accepted because blockchain contracts 
are cross–jurisdictional and international, among parties of varying nationalities.76 
Accordingly, smart contracts need their own dispute resolution systems.77  In-
terest in smart contracts will continue to grow, meaning more and more smart con-
tracts will be created, and as is true with any form of contract (smart or otherwise) 
some disputes are inevitable.  Coding for possible breaches of contract can only go 
so far because there will always be a lack of foresight and information, as well as 
unpredictable human behavior.78  There also will be technical problems and mis-
takes in the coding.79  Furthermore, traditional litigation fails to address smart con-
tracts’ need for remedies that preserve anonymity and fit within the blockchain.80  
Courts and traditional processes simply will not work for resolving smart contract 
disputes. 
B. Automation Concerns 
As our lives have moved online, artificial intelligence (“AI”) and automation 
have infiltrated everything from the movies we watch to the contracts we con-
clude.81  AI-powered marketing tracks what we watch on services like Netflix, and 
delivers suggestions for future viewing.82  AI thus recognizes patterns of behavior, 
generates new knowledge from these patterns, and makes predictions, often using 
algorithms.83  Among other things, AI has been applied to power self-driving cars 
and targeted consumer advertising.84 
However, automation has a different meaning in smart contracts.  As Nick 
Szabo has explained, a smart contract is “a set of promises specified in digital form” 
carried out automatically by an algorithm. 85  Smart contracts do not operate on mere 
predictions.  Instead, once a smart contract is created and put on the blockchain, 
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execution is automated and irrevocable, or at least prohibitively expensive to re-
voke.86  As such, smart contracts essentially eliminate “do-overs.”  They are self-
governing and self-executing.87 
One scholar has compared smart contracts to vending machines: the product is 
delivered once money is received with no ability for human intervention.88  In other 
words, the terms are “embedded” in the machine, and it performs (delivers a prod-
uct) in response to receiving the requisite amount of money.89  The machine cannot 
refuse to perform, and its structure (thick glass face) protects the product from theft 
or fraud.90  This means that one cannot make post hoc changes to her selections.  If 
one chooses chips, she is stuck with chips.  This is very efficient because the self-
execution eliminates transaction costs.  However, the consumer may grow angry 
when the chips get stuck and they don’t fall all the way down to the doorway where 
they can be retrieved. 
Smart contracts are similarly self–executing.  As noted above, this automation 
makes smart contracts very attractive in terms of efficiency and diminished enforce-
ment costs.  Cryptoeconomists, or proponents of smart contracts, therefore argue 
that smart contracts beneficially replace contract law, based on the belief that cir-
cumventing the legal system is desirable.91  They claim that smart contracts increase 
efficiency, lower transaction costs, and largely eliminate the need for lawyers or 
courts.92 
However, scholars such as Verstraete argue that smart contracts are “norma-
tively illegitimate.”93  Their principle criticism of smart contracts is that they are 
founded on “classical legal thought” that aims to eliminate state involvement in 
private law.94  Cryptoeconomists, like classical legal thinkers, essentially applaud 
smart contracts’ circumvention of government control.95  In contrast, Legal Realists 
argue that the state has a necessary role in regulating the fairness of the private 
marketplace, including contracts.96  They worry that powerful parties and unscru-
pulous dealers will hijack smart contracting, and their automatic and extra-legal 
nature will leave victims with no recourse.97  
An example of automatic enforcement gone awry is the 2016 DAO (or decen-
tralized autonomous organization) debacle.  Blockchain enthusiasts created the 
2016 DAO using blockchain and a web of smart contracts as the foundation for 
what was to be a tamper-proof extra-legal company on the blockchain.98  The 2016 
DAO was a literal autonomous organization that would continue without the need 
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for code changes once it began its operations.99  A flaw in the DAO design, how-
ever, allowed an individual to withdraw $50 million from the DAO without any real 
“breach” or fraud.  Moreover, the DAO’s self-enforcing code and lack of applicable 
legal rules eliminated means for reversal or traditional remedies.100  The only re-
course was to completely terminate the DAO and admit defeat.101  
Some also raise the “oracle problem” as a hindrance for fair smart contracting.  
This refers to the lack of a reliable and secure delivery mechanism that exchanges 
real time information with blockchain data systems.102   Currently, there is no 
clearly secure delivery of information among systems.103  For example, most exist-
ing oracles are run on centralized or single source services which have the same 
security issues as most traditional data systems that can be “hacked” centrally.104  
Nonetheless, some companies are working to address this issue.  For example, 
ChainLink is working on fixing this problem by combining its software with a hard-
ware system called Town Crier. ChainLink is a group that connects smart contracts 
with off-chain resources by selling usage of data feeds, APIs, and other payment 
capabilities to smart contracts on a decentralized network.105  Town Crier uses a 
process that cannot make system calls but can take in data from outside a protected 
address, to protect the data connection from outside attacks and keep the infor-
mation confidential using cryptography.106   Accordingly, this is just one example 
of how smart contracts problems are being addressed with technology. 
Despite these advances, smart contracts remain in a cloud of legal and techno-
logical uncertainty.  Although smart contracts provide efficiencies and cost-savings, 
they create risks related to automation and limited remedies.  The questions there-
fore focus on likely remedies and means for smart contract dispute resolution. 
IV.  BRINGING ONLINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION INTO SMART CONTRACTS 
Developers and entrepreneurs are moving quickly to create solutions for re-
solving smart contract disputes.  They realize that these disputes demand non-judi-
cial remedy systems that are cross-jurisdictional, extra-legal, and efficient.  Accord-
ingly, start-up companies are creating online dispute resolution (“ODR”) systems 
in the blockchain.  The primary ODR models to date have been online arbitration, 
crowd-sourced dispute resolution, and AI-powered resolutions. Developments in 
each of those areas are discussed below. 
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A. Arbitration 
Arbitration “took its rise in the very infancy of Society” as a private and self-
contained process, outside of the courts.107  Communities created arbitration sys-
tems designed to quickly and efficiently determine disputes in accordance with lo-
cal norms and accepted equitable principles.108  These self-contained arbitration 
systems served community needs for efficient, economical, equitable and private 
proceedings. 109  By the early twentieth century, nearly every trade or profession 
had developed its own machinery for arbitration.110  Indeed, the New York Chamber 
of Commerce arbitration panels were independent from the judiciary and continued 
to resolve disputes between American and British merchants during and after the 
American Revolution. 111  Given this history of resorting to extra-legal resolutions, 
it is no surprise that developers have turned to online arbitration for resolving block-
chain disputes. 
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1. Sagewise 
Sagewise is a Los Angeles-based start-up aiming to provide dispute resolution 
infrastructure for smart contract disputes.112  Notably, the Sagewise platform does 
not itself provide arbitration or have ODR capability.  Instead, Sagewise’s technol-
ogy is integrated into a smart contract via a coded clause in which users pre-set 
certain parameters, such as when and how long the smart contract execution should 
be delayed and who will resolve any disputes that may arise.113  Accordingly, this 
clause allows a party to freeze contract execution and activate the Sagewise “Dis-
pute Resolution Mode” if a dispute develops.114  The party can then choose various 
dispute resolution processes for solving smart contract problems and enforcing 
online judgments.115 
In this way, Sagewise claims to be “dispute resolution agnostic.”116  In other 
words, although Sagewise appears to be leaning in the direction of incorporating 
online arbitration as the final, and definitive, step for resolving disputes, it also al-
lows parties to incorporate online mediation or other resolution processes into the 
contracts.117  
The process begins with what Sagewise calls its “contract canary,” which is a 
notification and monitoring system like Google Alerts, for smart contracts.  
Through this system, execution of the smart contract is delayed for a short period 
of time while parties are notified of imminent execution.  If the smart contract ap-
pears to be executing in an unintended fashion, users can “freeze” execution of the 
smart contract before it is too late, and take the time to resolve the issue.  At that 
point, parties may use negotiation and other means for seeking mutual resolution.   
If that does not end the dispute, parties then move on to resolve their dispute with 
their pre–appointed dispute resolution provider, who was selected from a market-
place of providers during initial smart contract set–up. Users may also return to the 
marketplace to the extent the third-party provider is unable to resolve the dispute—
i.e., if the provider has a conflict of interest or is no longer in business. Providers 
on the marketplace may range from resolution by an automated bot to a traditional 
panel of arbitration judges.118 
Sagewise aims to distinguish itself by also being blockchain and distributed 
ledger agnostic. Currently, the company intends to support Ethereum and Hedera 
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Hashgraph, and helps chair the Dispute Resolution and Arbitration Working Group 
for the EOS Alliance.119 
2. OpenBazaar Dispute Resolution 
OpenBazaar is a market platform for the sale of goods and services using 
bitcoin, and requiring online arbitration to ensure that exchanges between parties 
are conducted with minimal risk.120  It states that it uses an open marketplace for 
arbitration to “facilitate a polycentric merchant law to accommodate the require-
ments and preferences of each individual.”121  In particular, OpenBaazar allows us-
ers to decide at the start if they wish to have an anonymous third party, called a 
notary, verify the contract, the funds, and find out if the parties believe that each 
has fulfilled its obligations. 122  Users opting for the notary pay a fee and deposit 
bitcoin into an escrow.123  The notary will then verify transactions and release funds 
as directed.124 
If either party is unsatisfied, the notary becomes an arbitrator, and determines 
the dispute based on evidence presented.125  These transactions on OpenBazaar are 
not entirely self-executing, and extra layers of verification may impede the plat-
form’s efficiency.126  However, OpenBazaar claims to choose qualified profession-
als in order to produce quality outcomes.127  It also boasts of transparency regarding 
its arbitration market.  It states: “These agents will list the duties they perform, the 
estimated response-time for their services, and fees. In addition to these, arbitration 
service providers can also display a list precedents that they themselves have estab-
lished or other arbiters have published in order to give an expectation of service 
process and quality.” [stet.]128  Accordingly, OpenBazaar seems to set up a fairly 
traditional arbitration mechanism. 
B. Crowdsourcing 
In contrast to simple online arbitration, crowdsourced dispute resolution uses 
what could be seen as “mob justice” by allowing anonymous users to vote on “win-
ners” on the blockchain.  Crowdsourced dispute resolution is not new.  For example, 
more than twenty years ago iCourthouse pioneered the notion of online crowdsourc-
ing in civil cases129 and ten years ago eBay India’s Community Court leveraged the 
best judgement of other eBay users to decide whether a contested eBay review 
should be deleted.130  The following examples of crowdsourced dispute resolution 
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on the blockchain go even further with this model, however, by tokenizing the pro-
cess.  In other words, jurors vote with funds (generally cryptocurrency) which they 
lose if they are on the losing side.  In contrast, jurors on the winning side generally 
gain some reward.  This creates a market for accurate crowdsourced resolution out-
comes.  The nuances of each system differ, as do the approaches utilized to address 
fraud and promote gamification. 
1. Kleros 
Kleros is a crowdsourced online arbitration “court” built on Ethereum for res-
olution of smart contract disputes.131  Applications for Kleros include managing 
disputes over escrow accounts and insurance payments, and resolving claims of 
abuse on social networks.  Kleros’s quest is to be “[a] fast, inexpensive, transparent, 
reliable and decentralized” ODR system built on game theory, and discovering a 
“Schelling point” for resolving disputes.132  This builds on Thomas Schelling’s the-
ory that in the absence of communication and trust, people will nonetheless choose 
“Focal Points” to reach consensus.133 
Specifically, Kleros enlists random “jurors” from around the world based on 
the number of “Pinakion” tokens (cryptocurrency) they deposit to show their avail-
ability and interest in resolving a given dispute.134  Parties to a dispute present their 
cases to the jurors, and jurors secretly make a “commitment” to vote for a particular 
party—with the proviso that they cannot change or reveal their votes before the 
voting is closed.135  Jurors are penalized for communicating with each other, and 
must “justify” their votes so that the parties can later understand their decisions.136 
After the vote is closed, the jurors reveal their votes and the resolution with the most 
juror support wins.137 
Jurors benefit from “winning” resolutions by taking the tokens of jurors who 
sided with the “losing” party.138  Additionally, jurors are paid from the arbitration 
fee the parties pay to use the Kleros court.139 These fees rise as parties appeal jury 
decisions.140  However, it is unclear that fees are paid with the Pinakion tokens.  
Instead, Kleros requires jurors to use Pinakion as “work tokens” designated for in-
dicating interest in being selected for jury duty and voting, in order to discourage 
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fraud.141  Kleros theorizes that staking Pinakions to show interest will prevent at-
tackers who would have to buy 51% of the staked tokens in order to “buy” the 
jury.142  Furthermore, as more jurors buy tokens, these tokens will become scarce 
and more expensive, making it even more difficult to amass the power necessary to 
take over the system.143  In addition, Kleros can fork the system if necessary because 
it controls the tokens.144 
Kleros also launched a study as a means for testing its system.145  The study 
asked voters to evaluate pictures featuring cats and/or dogs, and to vote “dog” or 
“not dog.” 146  After tabulating the votes, the researchers found that 70% of the cases 
resolved in favor of the plaintiff, and in the majority of those cases, by a unanimous 
vote.147  The study also looked at the effect of bribes on the voting outcomes, and 
determined that if a case proceeded to appeal, the honest voter received a substantial 
payout.148  This disincentives bribery.  In other words, one would have to buy and 
stake a great deal of tokens in order to even “bet” on overtaking the honest voters.149 
Regardless, these jurors need not have any substantive knowledge related to the 
cases.  They simply need to stake tokens to show interest. 
2. Aragon 
Aragon Network also uses crowdsourced ODR.  At its core, however, Aragon 
is a blockchain application that allows users to enforce smart contracts and develop 
DAOs, mentioned above, which are autonomous organizations that can own prop-
erty and take action through digitized processes. 150  Aragon aims to create flexible 
human-readable agreements that parties can enforce via Ethereum by depositing 
collateral in the form of digital assets, namely the Aragon Network Token 
(“ANT”).151  Furthermore, users of the network agree to Aragon’s online arbitration 
mechanism for resolving disputes, which uses crowdsourcing similar to Kleros.152  
However, Aragon argues that its process is unique because it “separates juror repu-
tation from collateral and introduces a novel escalation metagame that makes the 
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schelling point for jurors more resistant to bribery attacks while minimizing reliance 
on victims paying appeal fees.”153 
More particularly, Aragon allows a user to bring a claim by posting a bond 
(typically ANT) with a brief of the complaint. 154  Five anonymous jurors are se-
lected from among the users and also post bonds (again, using ANT cryptocur-
rency).155  Jurors who side with the winning party receive a monetary reward, while 
those who are not in the majority do not get their bonds back.156  A party can appeal 
by posting an even larger bond as the complaint moves up the process, and finally 
may reach the Aragon “supreme court” judges—these judges are those with the 
highest success rates on the network.157 
Aragon’s ultimate goal is to become fully autonomous through connected smart 
contracts and decentralized dispute resolution.158  Proponents of Aragon argue that 
this voting and decentralization will prevent most disputes.  Furthermore, the de-
centralized arbitration process noted above will render government unnecessary in 
the operation of DAOs.159  Despite the many potential benefits of Aragon, however, 
even its supporters have questioned whether its arbitration system is truly unbiased 
and whether it effectively prevents “gaming” of the system by repeat players.160  In 
addition, it is unclear whether robust mechanisms are in place to fix software bugs 
and deter attackers from exploiting those bugs.161 
3. Jur.io 
Like Kleros, Jur promises fast and fair online dispute resolution using 
crowdsourcing and game theory. Jur operates much like Kleros in that disputing 
parties offer resolutions along with a number of tokens to “stake” their proposals.162 
Voters decide which proposal to uphold and a decision is rendered at the end of 
twenty-four hours, or longer if parties so choose.163  Other token holders vote for 
one of the options, and the option that receives the majority of the votes wins.  Like 
Kleros, voters who vote against the majority are penalized by losing tokens.  The 
theory is that this will encourage fair voting, while discouraging dishonesty.  Jur 
advertises itself as a free service to users for creating and securing smart contracts, 
and resolving contract disputes within 24 hours.164 
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Accordingly, Jur’s key promise seems to be speed and security in smart con-
tracting.165  Jur’s dispute resolution system can be open or closed, allowing random 
token-holders to vote or only particular voters who are vetted.166  Jur claims to be 
unique in offering users the opportunity to create their own hub (a “specialized or-
acle”) which operates on special rules that users in particular industries will create 
to fit their contexts.167  Additionally, the Jur platform provides tools for signing 
contracts, and creating and reselling contract templates.168  
Nonetheless, Jur acknowledges that two parties can use its platform to create 
an illegal contract or contract that is substantially unfair to one party.169  It uses the 
same economic incentive system that guides its oracles in order to reject unethical 
disputes.170  Like other voters, those who prevail in the “reject” decision earn tokens 
for being on the winning side.171  
C. “Bot” Resolutions 
As noted above, AI is growing in acceptance.  In fact, it is even entering the 
courtroom and disrupting the law.172  AI is helping judges set bail, and lawyers do 
legal research.173   Ideally, algorithms may assist fair and efficient dispute resolution 
for smart contracts by providing predictive analysis and quickly suggesting resolu-
tions that may be subsequently entered into the blockchain.  Furthermore, these al-
gorithms will likely become “smarter” with the infusion of more data.  
Nonetheless, use of AI can be problematic, and can even potentially worsen the 
risk of bias in determinations.174  First, there is evidence that people tend to defer 
to statistical data instead of using the data to help form an independent judgment.175   
Accordingly, use of AI to provide “bot” predictions to judges or arbitrators could 
essentially mean bots actually decide cases, when the determining parties “rubber 
stamp” these predictions.  This is made worse when AI algorithms rely on data that 
reflects human prejudice.176   This is the “garbage in, garbage out” problem that 
occurs when AI “learns” from biased information.  Some also worry that use of AI 
for “bot” resolutions may take on a life of its own, rendering it harder to identify 
the factors leading to a particular outcome as machine learning progresses.177  
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Of course, the day may come when predictive analytics and AI are capable of 
rendering quick and fair resolutions in all smart contract cases.  Furthermore, AI 
may have a place in providing predictions of how best to resolve disputes, which 
the parties may consider in crafting their own resolutions.  Nonetheless, AI is cur-
rently not sufficiently advanced to provide “bot” resolutions with no human input 
for most smart contract disputes. 
V.  ENVISIONING A ROBUST ODR SYSTEM FOR SMART CONTRACTS 
It has become common in many traditional contracts to include “dispute reso-
lution clauses” or “arbitration clauses” that specify the redress process that will be 
utilized should a disagreement arise regarding the contract.  More than half of the 
employment agreements drafted in the U.S. contain such clauses178 and hundreds 
of millions of consumer contracts contain such clauses as well.179  If you go to an 
office supply store and buy a book of useful business contract templates, odds are 
they will have embedded arbitration clauses (usually specifying the American Ar-
bitration Association).  There is a reason for this: specifying dispute resolution pro-
cedures in contracts can streamline resolutions and minimize the risk of resource-
consuming litigation.  Any General Counsel worth his or her salt knows this, and 
will guide executives to be proactive in inserting such clauses. 
The wisdom of this advice is equally relevant in smart contracts.  When agree-
ments are made between individuals or organizations, problems will inevitably 
arise, no matter how much careful planning is present at the creation of the agree-
ment.  But because smart contracts operate so differently than traditional contracts, 
we need to envision resolution systems that are similarly different in their operation. 
As we have described, ODR is a good fit with smart contracts because it works 
the way the internet works.  Redress processes can be built directly into the agree-
ments themselves, independent of legal jurisdiction.  If technology is used to craft 
the smart contract (maybe within a marketplace or a legal services website) then a 
clause can be inserted at creation specifying the use of an ODR system within that 
software platform should any dispute eventually arise.  For example, if a party uses 
RocketLawyer to draft a reseller agreement as a smart contract, the contract can 
specify the use of the RocketLawyer Resolution Center for dealing with any dis-
putes in the performance of the contract. 
In smart contracts, the ODR clause can operate in the same manner as the An-
don System in the field of quality control.  The Andon System is an element of the 
Jidoka quality-control method pioneered in Japan by Toyota.180  It says that any 
worker on a production line has the authority to push a button to stop the line if they 
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identify a problem.181  In the smart contract context, an ODR clause coded into the 
smart contract can enable both parties to push a similar (perhaps virtual) button to 
stop the execution of the smart contract, triggering the ODR process.  The ODR 
process could then follow in accordance with the parties’ previous agreement (per-
haps mediation, arbitration, or crowdsourced resolutions).  Depending on the out-
come achieved, the smart contract may then resume operation along the previous 
lines, or perhaps it will be left inactive and replaced by a new agreement that will 
also be coded into a smart contract and put on the blockchain. 
In this way, the ODR clause in the smart contract can operate like an escrow 
arrangement.  Instead of only two parties to the agreement, the inclusion of the ODR 
clause creates a role for a third party, the dispute resolution service provider.  If 
either of the first two parties presses the Andon button, the role of the third party is 
automatically invoked.  In an escrow arrangement, a trusted third party holds pay-
ment until the payor indicates that it is satisfied, at which point the payment is re-
leased to the payee.  In a smart contract ODR clause, either party can invoke the 
ODR process at any time.  This freezes the execution of the smart contract and gives 
the neutral third party the power to determine the appropriate path forward from 
that point. 
Nonetheless, this process should not allow a party to use the type of delay and 
hindrance tactics that currently plague litigation. In other words, parties should not 
thwart efficiency of smart contracts with continual and/or frivolous “freezes.”  Strict 
time limits must be embedded in the ODR process, and penalties applied against 
those who misuse the ability to freeze smart contract execution.  There could also 
be limits on when parties are able to use a freeze.  For example, the smart contract 
code could include examples of when a freeze is proper—such as where there is an 
indication that something is awry with the performance or code in the blockchain. 
At the same time, another way to ensure enforcement is to require the parties 
to maintain a deposit balance in escrow for the term of the contract.  For example, 
payors could put the required funds into a neutrally administered account to ensure 
that a) they would be able to reclaim the funds should they not be satisfied with the 
performance of the payee, and b) payees would be assured that the funds were avail-
able and the payors would not default on their debts.  The escrowed funds could 
also be released in stages upon the achievement of pre-determined milestones.  This 
also obviates the need for any collection enforcement, which consumes great 
amounts of time and resources in traditional contracts.182 
The ideas and providers noted above for resolving smart contracts demonstrate 
the range of possibilities and opportunities for creativity.  Any of the methods de-
scribed could work as the redress process for smart contract disputes.  Some parties 
may opt for human-driven resolution systems, such as assisted negotiation or fast 
arbitrations by experts in the field.  For example, there would be panels of neutrals 
for the various types of smart contract disputes that are likely to arise, such as a 
panel of neutrals who understand computer coding, who could offer solutions to 
coding disputes.  Additionally, other ODR panels would include shipping experts 
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who can address supply chain issues.  There may also be a need for legal experts 
who can quickly respond to contract defenses, such as unconscionability, that are 
certain to arise.  Other parties may opt for crowdsourced systems, as described 
above, or machine–learning/AI powered systems that can deliver quicker decisions 
in lower value, less complex cases. 
In fact, having a range of options ensures that each individual smart contract 
can be best matched with an ODR process that the parties feel is appropriate.  As 
we say in the face-to-face dispute resolution field, it is important to “fit the forum 
to the fuss.”183  Having variety in ODR processes and procedures will ensure every 
type of smart contract can be matched with an appropriate redress design.  In fact, 
as smart contracts and blockchain evolve, innovation will continue within the ODR 
provider community, ensuring that ODR options remain innovative, modern, rele-
vant, and easy to use. 
One body that has thought through these designs in a detailed fashion is EOS.  
EOS.IO is a blockchain protocol powered by the native cryptocurrency, EOS. 
EOS.IO operates as a smart contract platform and decentralized operating system 
intended for high volume commercial transactions. The system is designed to elim-
inate transaction fees and conduct millions of transactions per second.184  The initial 
EOS whitepaper envisioned that fast and fair resolutions would be essential to pro-
mote trust and stability within the EOS framework.  This created a dispute resolu-
tion body tasked with resolving dispute claims upon network launch. 
EOS’ Standards for Dispute Resolution are intended to serve as fundamental 
ethical guidelines for dispute resolution providers and to transparently lay out the 
resolution process for any disputes that arise.  The Standards are enforced by the 
EOS governing bodies, and if any ODR provider is determined to violate the stand-
ards, they may be subject to suspension, fines, or ejection from the provider mar-
ketplace.  The Standards require ODR providers to be impartial, free from conflicts 
of interest, competent, fair, transparent, and committed to preserving the confiden-
tiality of the parties.  These Standards preserve enough flexibility for ODR provid-
ers to offer a variety of innovative approaches to redress, while ensuring a level of 
baseline quality and trust that will attract and retain users of the EOS platform.  It 
is likely that their foresight in creating these Standards will lead other blockchain 
and smart contract systems to follow suit. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Smart contracts and blockchain are growing fast, but for now they represent 
only a tiny portion of the massive $450 billion global legal marketplace.  It remains 
to be seen how long it will take them to (or in fact, if they will ever) reach the tipping 
point of widespread adoption.  Advocates of innovation often have projections 
around adoption rates that are clouded by self-interest.  If the growth of ODR in e-
commerce is any indication, it may take ten to fifteen years before smart contracts 
are commonly utilized in everyday legal agreements. 
But one development that will be essential to widespread adoption is fast and 
fair redress.  Early adopters may be willing to risk some growing pains in making 
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the decision to use smart contracts for their agreements.  However, the vast majority 
of contract signatories will wait until smart contracts are stable, proven, tested, and 
trustworthy.  Building effective ODR into smart contracts will be a crucial step in 
achieving that level of certainty. 
Of course, there will be horror stories that emerge along the way.  Just as cryp-
tocurrencies had to endure fiascos like Silk Road,185 Mt. Gox,186 and the 2018 
“coinpocalypse”187 on their way to acceptance, smart contracts will raise their own 
stories of gloom and doom.  There will be abusive smart contracts, and kangaroo-
court processes for resolving disputes.  However, the efficiency and safety of smart 
contracts will become increasingly sophisticated, and intelligent ODR providers 
will emerge to resolve related disputes.  Ethical standards for ODR promoted by 
organizations like the EOS Standards for Dispute Resolution and the International 
Council for Online Dispute Resolution will go a long way toward building parties’ 
confidence in ODR.188  Additionally, innovation and competition among startups 
designing and providing ODR systems will promote best practices.  Accordingly, 
unscrupulous actors will remain exceptions that fuel learning opportunities on the 
path to more trustworthy and ethical smart contract redress systems. 
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